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Editorial 
Intellectuals and War 
 
David Drake Institut d’études européennes, Université Paris VIII 
with Debra Kelly University of Westminster 
 
The essence of the interface between intellectuals and war is choice. Of course, this is true for 
members of all populations caught up in war but more so for the intellectual who enjoys a high 
cultural profile and who intervenes in the public space. In considering the issue of intellectuals and 
war, the first part of this introduction will initially focus almost exclusively on the two world wars 
in order to consider the case of: intellectuals whose conscription in the armed forces modified their 
status as intellectuals; intellectuals who contributed to the war effort by living out or adapting their 
role as intellectuals to a new set of circumstances; and intellectuals who opposed war. Attention is 
then paid to the fragmentation of intellectual communities occasioned by war, a theme extended by 
a consideration of intellectuals and competing claims of legitimacy in a country under foreign 
occupation (in this case France 1940–1945). Finally, the role of the intellectual in a covert war will 
be examined. It is clearly way beyond the compass of a short contribution such as this to address 
any of these questions in detail and, because of restricted space, only a limited number of examples 
of intellectuals can be given. But it is hoped that the article will provoke thoughts and raise issues 
that may be developed elsewhere by others. 
 
Mobilization of the intellectuals in the armed forces in two world wars 
Unless they were exempt on grounds of age or ill-health, French and British intellectuals were 
mobilized in both world wars. But although it was expected that intellectuals should contribute to 
the war effort by joining the armed forces, their commitment to the national cause was nonetheless 
questioned in some quarters on both sides of the Channel. In France, in the 1930s, many 
conservatives took the view that far too many intellectuals were over-sympathetic to the USSR and 
‘Bolshevism’, while in Britain during the same period, a traditional distrust of intellectuals had been 
reinforced by a belief, again in conservative circles, that the left/liberal intellectuals were 
undermining the patriotic spirit. This view, already common currency well before the outbreak of 
war, had been compounded by the Oxford Union vote in 1933 not to fight for King and country. At 
the annual meeting of the Royal Society of St George which took place shortly afterwards, 
Churchill declared, ‘The worst difficulties from which we suffer…come from the unwarrantable 
mood of self-abasement into which we have been cast by a powerful section of our own 
intellectuals’ (Mawson 1942, quoted in Weight 2002: 44). 
These reservations not withstanding, when war was declared in 1939, intellectuals on both 
sides of the Channel were among the millions conscripted: the historian Christopher Hill, who had 
learned Russian during a year spent in the USSR, was transferred from the intelligence Corps to the 
Foreign Office; Raymond Williams was a commissioned officer in a tank unit which was in 
Normandy after D-Day before advancing through Belgium and Holland to Germany. E. P. 
Thompson served as a commissioned officer in North Africa and Italy, while his fellow historian 
Eric Hobsbawm remained a sergeant in the Education corps.1 Across the Channel, André Malraux 
joined a tank unit, Louis Aragon was in a motorized division, André Breton worked in a medical 
section (Spotts 2008:9), while both Raymond Aron and Jean-Paul Sartre were allocated to 
meteorological units, the former based near the Belgian border, the latter, like author and future 
collaborationist Robert Brasillach, stationed in Alsace (Aron 1983: 162ff.; Cohen-Solal 1985: 
193ff.; Pellissier 1989: 247ff.). Mobilization of intellectuals in support of the national war effort is 
rarely contentious. A notable exception, however, is the case of German Nobel Prize Winner 
Günther Grass who, in August 2006, revealed in an interview in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
that he had been a member of the Waffen SS towards the end of the war (Grass 2006). 
Most intellectuals would have shared Jean-Paul Sartre’s initial call-up experience: ‘I saw 
myself torn away from the place where I was, whisked away from the people who mattered for me 
and taken by train to somewhere I had no desire to go with other fellows who didn’t want to go any 
more than I did’ (Sartre 1976; my translation). Sartre was lucky. He was able to use the Phoney War 
to read, and also wrote over a million words in his diaries and letters to friends and lovers. He was 
captured in June 1940, held for a few months in a POW camp and then made his way back to Paris. 
Other intellectuals in both world wars were less lucky. In World War I, for example, French poet, 
writer and leading Dreyfusard Charles Péguy, Alain-Fournier, author of Le Grand Meaulnes, and 
English poet Wilfred Owen were among the intellectuals who lost their lives, while the poet and 
leading member of the Paris avant-garde Guillaume Apollinaire survived trepanation after being 
wounded, only to die of Spanish flu at the end of 1918.2 World War II fatalities among intellectuals 
included the writer Paul Nizan, Sartre’s friend and young alter ego, killed near Dunkirk in 1940, 
and the writer and aviator Antoine de Saint Exupéry, author of Le Petit Prince and Vol de Nuit who 
was killed in action in July 1944. 
 
Mobilization of intellectuals quâ intellectuals in two world wars 
In both world wars intellectuals volunteered or were called upon to make a contribution to the war 
effort specifically as intellectuals. For example, in Britain in September 1914, a group of authors 
including Arnold Bennett, Thomas Hardy, J. M. Barrie, G. K. Chesterton and H. G. Wells attended 
the first meeting of the War Propaganda Bureau (Buitenhuis 1989; Field 1991) while in France, 
President Poincaré was calling on intellectuals to contribute to the war effort with ‘their pens and 
their words’ (Hanna 1996: 1). And indeed in a spirit of union sacré, both ex-Dreyfusards and 
former anti-Dreyfusards came together to agitate in defence of France against foreign aggression 
and incursion into national territory – thus placing on hold the question of which ‘France’ they were 
defending, a republican or a conservative, xenophobic one. The French intellectuals’ united front 
was consolidated by the publication in Germany in October 1914, of ‘An Appeal to the Civilized 
World’ signed by 93 leading German intellectuals. This manifesto defended German military action 
and has been described as ‘the most vilified document to come out of Germany in the early war’ 
(Hanna 1996: 80). As for British intellectuals, ‘British scholars, writers and artists were as 
antipathetic to Germany as German scholars were to Britain, and as ardent in their enthusiasm for 
the war effort as were the French’ (Hanna 1996: 22). 
But it was not just ‘pens and words’ that were used by intellectuals to support war efforts: 
the spoken word and image also had their part to play. In France during the Phoney War, the 
playwright Jean Giraudoux was unexpectedly appointed head of propaganda and charged with 
maintaining the morale of the French population, but his lofty, erudite radio broadcasts seemed to 
belong to a bygone age and were an inadequate response to the propaganda rants of Dr Goebbels. 
Across the Channel, George Orwell spent two years producing cultural radio programmes aimed at 
intellectuals in India and South-east Asia which, it later transpired, went out with a very weak signal 
at a time when even the minority of the target audience who had radio sets were unlikely to be 
listening (Crick 1980: 283). Among the many examples of the contributions made to the war effort 
by artists we can cite, in Britain, the cases of Paul Nash and Stanley Spencer. Nash had been an 
official war artist in World War I, and ‘his paintings The Menin Road and We Are Making a New 
World were among its defining images’ (Gardiner 2004: 470). Nash’s experience in World War I 
had led him to conclude that machines rather than men were the principal movers of warfare and, 
appointed to the RAF in World War II, his paintings containing crashed Nazi planes ‘were designed 
to emphasise the incongruity of the alien machine helpless in the idyllic landscape of the English 
countryside’ (Gardiner 2004: 475). At the same time Stanley Spencer, the shy romantic artist from 
the Berkshire village of Cookham, was dispatched to paint the shipyards on the Clyde (Weight 
2002: 54; Gardiner 2004: 480-481). In France the photographer Henri Cartier-Bresson and film-
director Jean Renoir were drafted into the army’s film and photo service (Spotts 2008: 9). 
While there is copious evidence of intellectuals’ desire to contribute to the war effort quâ 
intellectuals, there is not always agreement about the precise role of the intellectual in the wartime 
order of things. In Britain during World War II, for example, intellectuals were still seen, and 
indeed many still saw themselves, as somehow different from the mass of the population. In 
January 1941, the literary biographer Lord David Cecil wrote of ‘the artist’s right to live in his ivory 
tower… [knowing] he may be at any moment be bombed out of it’ (Gardiner 2004: 493), while in 
the same year Stephen Spender, George Orwell and Arthur Koestler signed a manifesto demanding 
that creative writers should be considered as a reserve occupation and ‘should be used to interpret 
the war world so that cultural unity is re-established and war effort emotionally co-ordinated’ 
(Gardiner 2004: 494). 
 
Opposition of intellectuals to war in two world wars 
Intellectuals opposed to each of the world wars were in a minority. During World War I, British 
philosopher Bertrand Russell’s activities in the No-Conscription Fellowship cost him his post at 
Trinity College in Cambridge and earned him a spell in prison, while Romain Rolland’s 
denunciations of the war from over the French border in Switzerland brought him pariah status. 
There was opposition too from participants in the War, notably from Henri Barbusse whose Le Feu 
(Under Fire) earned him the epithet ‘the Zola of the trenches’ and from Eric Maria Remarque, the 
German author of All Quiet on the Western Front, whose book, like Barbusse’s, was based on 
personal experience. Because of problems with finding a publisher, the book did not appear until 
1929 and was soon banned and burned by the Nazis because of its anti-war sentiments. In Britain, 
probably the most celebrated anti-war writings are the poems by Siegfried Sassoon and Wilfred 
Owen, both of whom had read and been impressed by Barbusse’s Under Fire. 
In the course of World War I, there were 1,310,000 Frenchmen killed or missing which 
represented 10.5% of the male population of working age, slightly higher than the figure for 
Germany (9.8%) and more than twice Britain’s losses (5.1%). To the figure for French losses 
should be added 1,100,000 severely wounded.3 These losses had enormous demographic, economic, 
social and political impacts on the post-war period in France, one of which was to fuel a powerful 
national pacifist movement. Members and supporters of this movement, many of whom were 
intellectuals, held that World War I had demonstrated beyond any doubt that war was the ultimate 
evil and one that should be avoided at whatever cost. It was this sentiment that was, for example, 
the binding force of a faction within the Comité de vigilance des intellectuels antifascistes (CVIA) 
of which the philosopher Emile Chartier (Alain) was a leading member. In September, ten days 
after war had been declared, a petition was published headed ‘Paix immediate’ (‘Peace Now!’), 
signed by over 30 intellectuals including Alain and Jean Giono, which asserted that the price of 
peace would never be as ruinous as the price of war.4 Bertrand Russell, who spent from 1938 until 
1944 in the USA, had adopted a powerful pacifist/defeatist position in Which Way to Peace? (1936) 
but he repudiated this when war broke out (Ryan 1988: 127-128). 
However, not all intellectuals opposed to war have been ‘fundamentalist pacifists’. In the 
late 1930s, a number of French intellectuals demanding peace not war were Nazi supporters or 
sympathizers like Drieu la Rochelle or Robert Brasillach, who were not opposed in principle to 
France going to war but were opposed to going war against Hitler’s Germany. Examples taken from 
other wars reveal other motives for opposing military intervention. The French surrealists were 
driven by a passionate anti-nationalism which, combined with an associated anti-colonialism, 
fuelled their attacks on the French military offensive in the Rif region of Morocco in 1925 (see, for 
example, Drake 2006). Anti-colonialism was a driving force of the intellectual opposition to the 
Algerian War (1954-1962) (Sirinelli 1990: 193-224; Rioux and Sirinelli 1991) denouncing the 
brutal behaviour of the French army (which included the widespread use of torture) as a betrayal of 
French republican values. But in both conflicts French intellectuals were deeply divided. Those, 
mostly liberals and leftists, who opposed armed intervention had nationalist conservative 
counterparts who backed the government and the army, and castigated their intellectual opponents 
as traitors. There are also those intellectuals who are not pacifists but who refuse to fight in 
particular wars. Raymond Williams, who, as has been noted, saw action in World War Two, refused 
to be conscripted for the Korean war and declared himself a conscientious objector (see for example 
Inglis 1995: 134). 
  
War and the fragmentation of intellectual communities 
War between states, civil war, revolution and even the threat of war provokes fragmentation and 
dispersal of intellectual communities, many of whose members choose to emigrate. Of course, this 
choice is not one faced by intellectuals alone, but intellectuals are frequently better placed to choose 
whether to leave or to stay than are other sectors of the population. It is probable that they will have 
sufficient means and contacts to facilitate departure and will be able to head for other foreign 
intellectual centres where they are likely to find their place. At the same time, they are unlikely to 
be the owners of factories or large properties, and thus would lose fewer material assets should they 
decide to leave. The intellectual ‘loss’ of one country is a frequently a gain for another. Perry 
Anderson has argued persuasively that British intellectual culture was crucially shaped, from the 
mid-twentieth century, by the influx of intellectuals from Poland, Austria, Russia and Germany who 
‘were by and large fleeing the permanent instability of their own societies – that is, their proneness 
to violent, fundamental change’ (Anderson 1969: 231). 
The question of whether to flee, and if so, where, was starkly posed in France in the 
aftermath of the debacle of May–June 1940. Intellectuals who had been mobilized and were still 
alive now found themselves scattered all over France or in German POW camps. A large number 
opted not to return to Paris, choosing to remain in, or make their way to, what became (until 
November 1942) the Unoccupied Zone. One of the effects of this migration was the rise in 
importance of Marseilles and, to a lesser extent Lyons, as cultural and intellectual centres. Others 
chose to make their way abroad: surrealists Max Ernst, André Breton, novelist Jules Romains and 
historian André Maurois were among many exiles who went to the USA (see, for example, Loyer 
2005), while Georges Bernanos settled for Brazil. The sociologist Raymond Aron and novelist 
Romain Gary left France and joined de Gaulle and the Free French in London. In Germany, almost 
a decade earlier, members of the Frankfurt School of Marxism (including Herbert Marcuse, 
Theodor Adorno and Eric Fromm) had fled Nazi Germany, initially to France and then to the 
United States. Walter Benjamin, the German literary critic, essayist, translator and philosopher at 
times associated with the Frankfurt School, later also tried to reach the USA but was prevented 
from crossing from France into Spain and killed himself at the border in September 1940.  
 
Intellectuals and occupation 
When there is a violent and illegal seizure of power in a nation state, or when a nation state is 
occupied by a foreign power, questions of legitimacy are immediately raised. This can clearly be 
seen if we consider the case of France 1940-1944. There was l’Etat français, based in Vichy and 
headed by Marshall Pétain who had sought and secured an armistice and whose government 
pursued a policy of collaboration with the occupier. There were the Free French under de Gaulle in 
London who refused to recognize that the war was over or that the authoritarian Vichy regime had 
any legitimacy. And there was the pro-Moscow French Communist Party (PCF) which, after the 
German invasion of the USSR (1941), threw itself wholeheartedly into resistance activities, 
although individual Communists and Communist cells had been active before this. 
French society split along fault-lines arising from the above, as did the intellectual 
community. There were those like Robert Brasillach and Drieu La Rochelle who became out-and-
out collaborators, and those like Charles Maurras and many of his Action Française followers who 
backed the Vichy regime but, unlike Brasillach and Drieu, remained steadfastly Germanophobic 
and, because of their long-standing and deep antipathy to Germany, refused to contemplate Nazi 
Germany as a model for France. André Gide and André Malraux, neither of whom supported the 
Vichy regime, decamped to the Midi to wait and see how things would turn out, although Gide 
moved on to Tunisia and then to Algeria. Others like the Communist poet Aragon went on to 
establish resistance networks in the south. And then there were those who remained in Paris. Some, 
like Picasso, continued working despite frequent visits to his studio by the German authorities, 
while others collaborated or resisted. One of the first resistance groups based at the Musée de 
l’Homme in Paris was animated by two intellectuals, Boris Vildé and Anatole Levitsky who were 
quickly arrested by French police, handed over to the Germans, tortured and shot in February 1942 
(see for example Blumenson 1978). As the war progressed, the intellectual resistance increased in 
significance and from 1942 the Comité national des écrivains (The National Writers’ Committee) 
and its publication Les Lettres françaises played an ever important role.5 Resistance could be active 
– writing, producing and distributing clandestine literature; and/or passive – not contributing to any 
publication produced under German censorship. The activities of intellectuals during the war 
constitute a vast topic, with one important work running to over 800 pages.6 But mention should be 
made here of one of the most significant pieces of resistance writing, namely Le Silence de la mer 
(1942) written by Jean Bruller under the pseudonym Vercors, which has been described as 
‘l’ouvrage emblématique de la Résistance littéraire’ (Winock 1997: 375).  
 
Intellectuals and covert war 
The issues confronting an intellectual in a covert war like the Cold War also raised questions of 
legitimacy and choice. In this stand-off in the shadow of nuclear weapons, intellectuals were under 
pressure to side either with the USA, which presented itself as the defender of individual freedom 
and democracy against threat posed by the totalitarian USSR, or with the Soviet Union which 
promoted itself as the champion of peace pitted against a reckless and bellicose United States. In the 
West, any intellectual who was a member of a Communist Party or who showed sympathy for the 
USSR was viewed with the greatest suspicion if not outright animosity by pro-American 
governments. The USSR directly and indirectly funded countless front organizations and fêted 
‘progressive’ intellectuals (i.e. those sympathetic to the USSR) in Moscow and in the case of 
Picasso and others, bestowed peace prizes on them (see for example Caute 1964 and 1988). But as 
Frances Stonor Saunders has shown (Saunders 1999), the CIA funded journals like Encounter and 
financed a vast programme which turned European intellectuals, sometimes wittingly, sometimes 
not, into mouthpieces of America (see also Grémion 1995). 
Since the end of the Cold War, the cause of anti-Communism has been replaced by the so-
called ‘war on terror’. This strategy, driven by George W. Bush and his administration following 
9/11 until his presidential defeat in 2009, thanks to general support in a largely complacent and 
servile mass media in the USA and the UK, resulted in intellectuals opposed to the strategy being 
labelled as ‘unpatriotic’ or as ‘undermining’ the efforts of the armed forces (in Iraq/Afghanistan) or 
those of the domestic security forces. Those intellectuals who spoke out were largely ignored and 
thus marginalized from mainstream public opinion. For example, since the publication of his best-
selling book 9-11 (2001), Noam Chomsky, Professor of Linguistics and Philosophy, continued to 
produce essays of about 1,000 words which have been critical of US policy under President Bush. 
Although many of these were published outside the USA, none appeared either in The New York 
Times, The Los Angeles Times, The Washington Post or The Boston Globe. Thus, his voice was 
largely silenced in the national ‘debate’, swamped by the deluge of conventional wisdom and pro-
government views pumped out by the mainstream media.  
In Britain, the playwright Harold Pinter was able to use his Nobel Prize acceptance speech 
in 2005 to continue his long-standing campaign against US foreign policy which had begun in 1973 
when he voiced his opposition to US involvement in the overthrow of Chile’s President Allende. 
Although his speech received wide coverage in the British ‘quality’ press, this had not always been 
the case: witness his support for the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua and his attacks on Turkey’s 
treatment of the Kurds. In France, a number of wars since the fall of the Berlin Wall have been the 
subject of intense debate conducted by intellectuals in the pages of leading publications. One thinks 
of the 1990s civil war in Algeria where the tough anti-Islamist line adopted by André Glucksmann 
and Bernard-Henri Lévy was countered by a more conciliatory position adopted by Pierre Bourdieu 
and others (see Drake 2000: 287-309), or the inter-intellectual debates during the Balkans conflict at 
the end of the twentieth century. So widespread is the view that intellectuals in France have a duty 
to take a position on conflicts that their silence is likely, in itself, to provoke a response. This was 
the case in January 2008 when the Tunisian writer and philosopher, Mezri Haddad, published a long 
article in Le Monde deploring ‘the unacceptable silence of the intellectuals on the punitive war 
inflicted by Israel on the Palestinians’ (Haddad 2008).  
Faced with the prospect or reality of war, intellectuals have to decide where they stand, 
knowing that their choices will come under close public scrutiny. In an inter-state conflict, the 
majority of European intellectuals have historically backed their nation’s war effort, sometimes to 
the extent of making the supreme sacrifice; those who have not have, in the main, been motivated 
by an uncompromising pacifism. However, if an intellectual believes that the state is negating its 
own ideals (e.g. France during the Occupation or the Algerian War) or that the human sacrifices 
which the state’s political or military leaders are demanding are intolerable and disproportionate to 
any possible gain (many of the World War I critics), or that the conduct of the war is incompetent 
(e.g. Sassoon), s/he may feel justified in speaking out or acting against it.  
 
Taking the debate forward 
Mikkel Bruun Zangenberg opens the contributions to this issue with a short intervention on the 
notion of ‘just war’. Continuing contemporary intellectual positioning with regard to recent and 
current conflicts, he highlights the philosophical and ethical stances of four intellectuals who, 
amongst several others noted in passing, have been ‘mobilized’ by events to comment on the second 
Iraq war and on the so-called ‘war on terror’. These four figures, Michael Walzer (the American 
just-war theorist), Slavoj Žižek (the Slovenian philosopher and cultural theorist), and Michael Hardt 
and Antonio Negri (together the authors of Empire, 2000 and Multitude. War and Democracy in the 
Age of Empire, 2004) represent, according to Zangenberg’s argument, three opposing attitudes 
towards the war in Iraq, all tending to characterize the war as unjust, ‘but for entirely different 
reasons, and grounded in mutually exclusive concepts and claims’. The question of whether the Iraq 
war is just or unjust also highlights, he goes on to argue, the dual positioning of all intellectuals 
engaged in the discussion of warfare. He further notes the ways in which the arguments of most 
Western intellectuals are ‘conditioned by a position in between the University and the political 
sphere’ and he leaves us as readers with the challenge of how we might engage with the notion of 
‘just war’ if we also consider ourselves ‘intellectuals’.  
The full-length articles which comprise this issue then proceed from a historical perspective 
beginning with World War I, allowing a comparison of the dilemmas, choices and conduct of a 
wide range of intellectuals from different nations and from various disciplines (ranging from 
literature to science to cinema), to the major conflicts of the twentieth century and into the twenty-
first century. The authors also consider, in the course of their analyses of these major figures, a 
series of complex key concepts for any examination of war – such as ‘justice’, ‘pacifism’, 
‘aestheticization’, ‘victory’, ‘defeat’, ‘collaboration’, ‘resistance’.  
Romain Rolland was a key figure of French political and literary life in the early twentieth 
century particularly during and after World War I. However, although already well known, he has 
not always figured prominently in the recent renewed academic interest in French experience and 
representations of the Great War. In the first article, Richard Francis aims to present a more 
nuanced understanding of Rolland’s celebrated ‘pacifism’, highlighting its complexities, 
ambiguities and contradictions, and thereby challenging the notion that Rolland was a confirmed 
pacifist during the war before converting equally unreservedly to the revolutionary cause in the 
1930s. Indeed, as Francis points out, despite being remembered as ‘one of the most powerful voices 
to emerge from France in 1914’, Rolland never described himself as a pacifist and ‘frequently found 
himself at odds with pacifists in the course of his long career’. The main aim here, therefore, is to 
trace the development of Rolland’s reluctance to be categorized by what the author terms the 
‘slippery’ term of pacifism which ‘can cover many different types of opposition to war’. Of 
particular note here is Rolland’s interest in the thinking of Gandhi during the 1920s, although by 
1931, when they finally met, Rolland was a vocal supporter of Communism, considering by then 
that Gandhism offered ‘only distant and uncertain hopes’, while Communism offered a more 
tangible chance to mobilize the masses in the West.  
The impact of World War I is also the subject of the Roy MacLeod’s contribution, but this 
time instead of the subject being the literary ‘man of letters’ in a specific national arena, MacLeod 
focuses on the role of scientists and the development of their work and of their profession in a more 
global context under the competing pressures of war. Evoking in the first instance the sociologist 
Max Weber speaking on ‘Science as a Vocation’ in 1917, MacLeod examines ‘the world of science 
[…] put to the test of war’, as he phrases it, contextualized within the scientific internationalism 
which had taken place in the three decades preceding the Great War. This was an ‘industrial conflict 
in which scientists, as such, were professionally mobilized’ and which divided this international 
world of science into ‘hostile political camps’. He then examines the differing conduct, involvement 
and attitudes of the scientific communities across Britain, France, Germany and the USA. While the 
effects of the war on science seem clear in the applications of scientific knowledge to the 
development of, for example, aviation, submarine warfare, communications, transport, medicine, 
nutrition (and the list can be expanded), MacLeod also argues that ‘the effects of the war on science 
as a profession were perhaps even more profound’, identifying a category of ‘scientific 
intellectuals’ which came to prominence during and after the Great War. He also begins to assess 
the larger consequences of the war and of its ‘scientific mobilization’ which were, it is suggested, 
‘individual and professional, intellectual and technical’ as it forged new relationships between 
science, governments and business, and between academics and the military – all of which equally 
engendered further ethical dilemmas and diverse standpoints concerning the morality of science in 
war as the twentieth century progressed. 
The aftermath and consequences of World War I informed intellectual debates in the inter-
war years, not least around notions of ‘victory’ and ‘defeat’, debates which continue to resonate in 
contemporary societies. In the 1920s and 1930s, as the German Ernst Jünger observed, the war left 
behind two opposed camps in Europe – the ‘progressive’ camp proclaiming ‘pacifism, 
internationalism and democracy’ and the nationalist camp. In his article, located in a German 
context, Roger Woods focuses firstly on Walter Benjamin’s reception of Ernst Jünger and on his 
understanding of the new nationalists grouped around him during the years of the Weimar Republic, 
and ends with the New Right in contemporary Germany, drawing parallels between patterns of 
thinking within the extreme right in the Weimar years and the extreme right in Germany today. 
Taking as an example the case of the development of Jünger’s thinking and various readings of his 
writing on war, Wood’s analysis proceeds from a careful examination of the notion of the 
aestheticization of experience – initially of World War I, and then of the new nationalist politics. He 
argues that as this aestheticization developed, it moved away ‘from working out a political 
programme which would bring together the two key forces of the period, nationalism and socialism, 
and towards a view of politics as style, hierarchy and leadership’ – with consequences, we might 
add, that would soon become only too apparent. Commenting on Benjamin’s interpretation of the 
war writings of the new nationalists, Woods suggests that Benjamin deserves recognition for 
‘establishing a causality between the awareness of defeat and the need to rescue something from the 
[First World] war – to convert its outcome into some kind of victory for Germany’. Benjamin ends 
up seeing cause and effect in the new nationalists’ ‘“perversion” of the outcome of the First World 
War and in the emergence of the fascist fighter’. Jünger concludes by advocating the relative 
unimportance of political programmes and favouring enthusiastic devotion to a leader who will 
settle ‘[…] the work of drawing up the nationalist ranks into an instrument of power’. The 
conclusion is that the New Right in Germany today is also trying but has hitherto repeatedly failed 
to work out a programme and instead resorts to the aestheticization of politics, in which ‘strong 
leadership and a self-justifying style take the place of rational thought’.  
World War II and its aftermath was, of course, to bring further dilemmas for intellectuals 
belonging both to ‘aggressor’ and ‘victim’ nations, and to notions such as ‘victory’ and ‘defeat’ 
were added those of ‘resistance’ and ‘collaboration’, again ensuring, as for the previous case study 
of Germany, the continuing relevance of ensuing debates for the understanding of contemporary 
societies. John Flower takes the particular case of the immediate post-war dispute between the 
prominent Catholic French writer, François Mauriac, generally recognized as intimately engaged 
with the intellectual resistance during the Occupation, and the art critic, travel writer and occasional 
novelist Jean-Louis Vaudoyer who between March 1941 and March 1944 had been the director of 
the Comédie française, the French national theatre in Paris. When Vaudoyer was nominated to take 
a vacant seat in the Académie française in 1946, Mauriac, already a senior member of the 
Académie, objected and accused him of collaboration, successfully appealing to the Communist-
dominated Comité national des écrivains for support. The careful analysis of the relationship 
between the two men conducted through the examination of extensive public and private 
documentation also reveals a great deal about the general atmosphere and codes of behaviour in 
France at the Liberation and into the post-war period, through the ‘purges’ carried out at all levels 
of society with the professed aim of ridding the Republic of all collaborators. This article therefore 
also highlights the wider impact of war, and in this case of Occupation, on the conduct of 
intellectuals and on the intellectual life of the nation both during conflict and in its aftermath. 
Unresolved ambiguities in the public roles undertaken and public and private choices made in ‘the 
deeply divisive atmosphere of the Occupation and the post-Liberation period could drive people 
into positions and to adopt attitudes which, in other circumstances, would only rarely have taken 
such an extreme form’.  
Lastly, Jonathan Ervine considers forms of intellectual positioning in the second half of the 
twentieth and into the beginning of the twenty-first centuries. He takes the specific case of French 
film-makers and their reactions to Vietnam, and then to 9/11 and the ‘War on Terror’ returning us to 
the some of the points raised above and in Zangenberg’s initial intervention. This article also serves 
to remind us that the film-maker may also be a very public intellectual who, of course, often reaches 
a much broader and larger audience than those locked in academic, and even political debate. 
France is taken here as an example of a nation with a long tradition of writers, artists and then film-
makers adopting political stances as public intellectuals. The analysis here focuses on two French 
coordinated portmanteau films, Chris Marker’s Loin du Vietnam (‘Far from Vietnam’, 1967) and 
Alain Brigaud’s 11’09’’01 September 11 (2002; the literal translation of the French title being ‘11 
minutes, 9 seconds, 1 image’). The two films are shown to share several cinematic and political 
preoccupations, ‘notably concerning the use of images in justifying and opposing war’, leading us 
back once again to the concerns of intellectuals across historical periods and across nations, as 
expressed throughout this issue. Critical reactions to the second of these films in particular lead 
Ervine to highlight a ‘potential tension between cinematic artistry and political issues in films which 
deal with war’, and thus inviting us to speculate further about cinema as medium for criticizing war. 
Towards the end of his article, Ervine reminds us that a consideration of the impact of war on forms 
of cultural production – a main focus of the Journal of War and Culture Studies and of its research 
group – can reveal artistic tensions between people ‘who share a political standpoint on a given 
conflict.’  
Finally, this introduction has to acknowledge the gender (im)balance here. The authors who 
contributed articles to this issue on intellectuals and war are all male; the intellectuals considered 
(with the exception of some of the film-makers referred to in the final article) are overwhelmingly 
male. Without wishing to enter into further discussion of why this is, it should nonetheless be noted 
that female intellectuals’ attitudes, writing and public interventions on war over the twentieth and 
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1 See Woodhams 2001: 49. The philosopher A.J. Ayer was a member of the Special Operations Executive (SOE), a 
volunteer force formed after the fall of France to wage a secret war behind enemy lines, while the poet Stephen 
Spender, having been declared medically unfit, eventually wangled his way into the London Auxiliary Fire Service. 
2 For more on French intellectuals and World War I, see Giovangeli 2004.  
3 Statistics quoted in Bernard 1975: 108. For a more detailed analysis of French losses, see Becker 1985: 330-333.  
4 The text of ‘Paix immédiate’ is reproduced in Sirinelli 1990: 122-123. 
5 For an account of the publication, see Daix 2004, especially pp. 97-187. A facsimile collection of all the clandestine 
issues of Les Lettres françaises (as well as those of Les Etoiles, edited by Louis Aragon and published in the southern 
zone) has recently been published: Eychart and Aillaud, 2008. 
6 Shapiro 1999. Other works include Parrot 1990; Betz and Martens 2004; Corcy 2005. 
